‘Not Fashioned for Fairweather Folk’: Preserving the Pacifist Identity During Total War

The outbreak of war in 1939 presented the WIL with an ideological challenge, as tensions between peace and freedom were developing.⁸ The growing proximity of the German offensive in 1940 troubled the WIL, with prominent members clashing over the organisation’s core purpose.⁹ Some WILPF members argued that the Nazi regime posed such a threat that military victory was the only path to preserving democracy. Others contended that supporting military action would compromise the League’s core mission of guiding humanity towards permanent peace. They felt abandoning pacifist principles during war would undermine the credibility of the peace movement.

This ideological clash was most apparent in the debate between prominent WIL members Dr Hilda Clark and Kathleen Innes. Clark argued that it had ‘become impossible to look to any other way of saving such progress as our democracy had made towards its ideals except through the overthrow of the forces battling against us’.¹⁰ Innes countered that ‘to forsake [our principles] in support of this or any war […] would be a serious setback to the coming of the day when war will be abolished. What respect could anyone have for a peace movement that abandoned its principles when war came?’¹¹ For Innes, military victory would only address fascism materially, not morally, since totalitarian ideologies would regenerate unless their underlying causes were addressed through structural social change.¹²

The WIL’s decision to remain officially pacifist reflected the WILPF members’ privileged position that both enabled and constrained their wartime work. Their ability to maintain pacifist principles whilst others faced occupation, persecution, or direct military engagement highlighted their class and national advantages. As Leila Rupp has explained, the League was predominantly home to white upper- and middle-class women, and European and American women dominated its leadership.¹³ This privilege was both a strategic asset and a limitation. It provided them with the safety and resources to undertake long-term planning that others could not, yet it also constrained their ability to speak for those directly under fascist rule. Nevertheless, this privileged position enabled many members to support the war effort personally through relief work whilst maintaining their commitment to permanent peace within the WILPF.¹⁴

Rather than weakening the organisation, this principled stance proved successful. By 1943, the WIL had not only recovered but exceeded its pre-war membership levels, with new branches established during the war.¹⁵ This organisational growth reflected the WIL’s successful navigation of the peace-versus-freedom dilemma and positioned them to undertake substantial war work focused on post-war planning.¹⁶ For the WIL, a ‘new social order’ represented a systematic approach to post-war reconstruction – the rebuilding of political, economic, and social structures in ways that would address the root causes of conflict and prevent future wars through structural changes to society.¹⁷ This work was developed in two phases.

‘Social Changes Under War Conditions’: Early Attempts at Pooled Intelligence

The first phase of the WIL’s war work was focused on critically analysing the impacts of war, both positive and negative. This work was most notably evident in their published study, Social Changes Under War Conditions (1941–2). This study was a collaboration with American WILPF members and highlighted eleven fundamental societal changes that had occurred since 1939. The goal was for the League to develop an international (or rather Western) image of the impact of war. This was arguably a precursor to the Pool of Opinion.¹⁸ The shared intelligence it gathered was used to inform the new social order by recording the ‘losses’ and ‘benefits’ of war. The study was a clear example of continuing international work.

For the WIL, internationalism meant maintaining active cooperation and communication across national boundaries despite wartime barriers and this formed the foundation of their peace work. However, this approach already revealed the structural constraints that would characterise their wartime solidarity. For example, cooperation remained confined to privileged Western sections, specifically Britain, the USA, and those in exile in these countries, with the resources and safety to continue operations. Nevertheless, it sustained discussions on policies surrounding the importance of human rights, economic planning, worldwide social security and training in International Mindedness – hoping to create a generation of people who could run international governments and organisations with empathy and peaceful principles in mind.¹⁹ This showed a commitment to internationalism and peace, despite the geographical constraints. It also provided information that could be discussed when war allowed all national sections of the WILPF to meet again.

Social Changes recognised that the totality of war – the money, human resources and energy which governments committed to the conflict – should be replicated to bring about peace. The WIL expanded its understanding through guest lectures, including one delivered by economist Honor Croome, who explained that post-war reconstruction should require government planning. Her reasoning was that the conflict had meant all resources, as far as practicable, had been transferred from individual needs to the government and the war effort ‘whether by conscription, requisition, taxation or borrowing’. Consequently, Parliament had become responsible for supplying necessities after the war. Croome explained that the Allied Purchasing Commission and Military Health Services, designed for war, could be repurposed to distribute food and medical care post-war.²⁰ She explained to the WIL that they had an opportunity to hold the government accountable for building a better social economy. Her key question was: if the government had proved they could transform society for war, why not for peace?

The WIL expanded on this. They recognised that local authorities and voluntary bodies had arranged ‘communal feeding’ for evacuees, reducing pressure on host households. Centres providing affordable midday meals were set up in evacuation and bombed areas. The WIL interpreted this growth in communal dining as a shift in English cultural habits that, if continued post-war, could help working-class mothers and children.²¹ This information would inform the post-war policies and recommendations the WIL could make to the government, and demonstrates that the WIL’s privileged position enabled them to observe and theorise about social changes affecting working-class communities.

Yet in consequence, as observers, they remained somewhat removed from the experiences of those most affected by wartime hardship. Though this was perhaps the point. WILPF members did relief work outside of the League; for example, during the war, Dr Hilda Clark and Edith Pye helped house orphaned child refugees fleeing from the Spanish Civil War and Jewish children.²² Yet, within the WIL, their work was dedicated to peaceful post-war planning, focused on how to shape national and international politics for the better. This was something the WILPF had always felt passionately about, feeling that the movement was one of international politics and diplomacy rather than a charity.²³ In this sense, their privilege ensured members had a dedicated intellectual space, protected from the war and the growing domestic and moral demands on women.²⁴

Overall, this systematic analysis of wartime social changes represented a sophisticated approach to policy development that went far beyond simple opposition to war. It enabled the WIL to remain active during the early war years by continuing to engage in peace work through the study. The collection of evidence on state intervention during the war gave them the power to lobby governments to implement social welfare, proving that the state could provide it both nationally and internationally.²⁵ The WILPF’s international communication and connection demonstrated solidarity even during the war and this was developed further in their second phase of wartime work, which extended beyond Anglo-American collaboration towards a more concrete plan for post-war reconstruction.

‘A Pattern of Life for Children Yet Unborn’: The Pool of Opinion and Post-War Reconstruction

The second phase of the WIL’s wartime work (1943–6) shifted from social analysis toward more concrete post-war policies. In early 1944, WIL leaders sensed a change in the international sphere. Harris reflected in her New Year’s speech that ‘in all human probability this new year […] will see a pattern of life set for our children and our children’s children yet unborn’.²⁶ Calling it a ‘moment of hope, not certainty’, she referenced the United Nations’ launch and urged a renewed effort for a fairer world.²⁷ This perceived historical turning point motivated the WIL to turn toward more international and impactful approaches.

Just as the WILPF had hoped the League of Nations would provide the machinery for lasting peace in 1919, now with more scepticism, they wanted the UN to aid in establishing a just and lasting peace. Their experience with the League of Nations taught them the importance of having feminist pacifists working with an international body from its inception.²⁸ Considering this, along with the success of the Social Changes report, the WILPF sought to pool intelligence.

The Pool of Opinion represented an effort to maintain international solidarity and prepare for post-war reconstruction through coordinated policy development. It achieved this through a questionnaire that posed twelve questions about world organisation, international law and human rights, economic planning, migration and refugees, and denazification.²⁹ It was organised by WILPF leaders Gertrude Baer (German Section) and Emily Balch (USA Section), and it reached all accessible national sections. Throughout late 1943 and 1944, local WIL branches discussed the questions at meetings and the Executive Committee drafted formal answers that reflected the general or majority views. These were submitted as official British Section responses and the WIL received answers from other sections for further discussion, thereby preparing for the uncertain but inevitable International Congress.³⁰

At the 1946 Congress, the questionnaire’s impact became clear as delegates reflected on its success in achieving multiple strategic objectives. Delegates explained that the questionnaire was an attempt to ‘keep living contact with sections where this was possible, to lead members to think on problems of importance to our common international work, and to bring such questions into clear focus by systematic discussion’.³¹ The Pool succeeded in three crucial ways: maintaining international ties despite wartime isolation, generating discussion on essential post-war reconstruction issues, and ensuring these conversations involved grassroots members rather than only leadership.

However, the Pool’s success in achieving its objectives could mask problems within the WILPF’s approach to international solidarity. Drawing on Carol Cohn’s analysis of how seemingly neutral language can reinforce existing hierarchies, the Pool’s rhetoric of ‘pooled intelligence’ functioned to give authority to a selective form of knowledge gathering that often maintained rather than challenged established power relations.³² The issue was not that the questionnaire excluded women from decision-making – it was designed by and for women’s organisations – but rather that it failed to interrogate which women’s voices constituted legitimate ‘intelligence’ and whose experiences remained silenced, regardless of intention.³³ The WIL’s responses to the Pool of Opinion demonstrate this contradiction: whilst the questionnaire successfully maintained international connections and facilitated policy development, it also revealed how the WILPF could reproduce the very exclusions they sought to challenge. This is evident in their approach to world governance, refugees, and economic policy.

Indeed, examining world organisation reveals the WIL’s understanding of international governance and the ability to learn from past failures. Specifically, the Pool’s second question asked what kind of world organisation the WILPF wanted – a World State based on Swiss or American federal systems, a revived League of Nations, a World Federation based on the Culbertson Plan, or something else?³⁴ The British Section favoured the World Federation, although they were concerned about the potential for national rivalry between federations and the lack of representation of people at the international executive level. These concerns demonstrated their analytical approach to international governance. They supported the concept whilst identifying specific structural problems that needed addressing. These concerns were justified considering the Culbertson Plan structure. The structure would divide the world into eleven regions: France, Germany, Poland, Turkey, Russia, China, Japan, Britain, the United States, India, and Malaysia.³⁵ However, Britain and the USA were represented twice as they would be placed in control of India and Malaysia and would have an American and British president for at least 12 years, regardless of elections.³⁶ The WIL feared that this significant lack of representation, particularly in the Executive, would fail to prevent war and rivalries. They believed the lessons learnt from the League of Nations should be applied to a World Federation as they recognised the UN had the potential to achieve permanent peace.

The Pool’s effectiveness became evident in how it shaped the 1946 Congress discussions and resolutions. During the 1946 Congress, Kathleen Innes built upon it by giving a speech on the political and economic situation. Innes stated that the WILPF needed to succeed in convincing States to give up national sovereignty in favour of an ‘Impartial Tribunal’ and a form of World Government. Having analysed the Culbertson Plan, the WIL, through Innes, were able to express concerns about reproducing national rivalries in a World Federation.³⁷ The wider WILPF agreed with this, passing a resolution declaring support for a ‘Democratic International Organisation of the World’ but also urging the ‘United Nations Assembly to protest and oppose all bilateral arrangements, spheres of influence and special Big Power divisions which jeopardise the effective functioning of the United Nations’.³⁸ This demonstrated how the Pool’s analysis during wartime enabled more sophisticated policy development and unified knowledge when the sections could finally meet. Yet the irony remained that their critique of ‘Big Power divisions’ did not prevent the WILPF from struggling with western sections like Britain and the USA being overrepresented in the League, with little input from the national sections of the very regions that they sought to protect.³⁹

The WIL’s approach to the Pool’s refugee questions reflected this, revealing both the WILPF’s progressive thinking and the limitations of their privileged position. Specifically, questions nine and ten addressed refugees and ‘minorities’. The WIL emphasised autonomy, stating that refugees should be allowed to choose whether to return home or to a new location (though returning home should be encouraged). This would be organised through an Intergovernmental Committee.⁴⁰ The WIL advocated for UN-funded food, housing and relocation.⁴¹ They expressed that whilst they felt self-determination was attractive, it was not feasible for all groups. Instead, they argued for cultural autonomy and representation within political federations as a more immediate action to protect human rights. The British Section also considered the concept of world citizenship. They recognised that national citizenship should remain standard but felt that those who had lost their nation might become world citizens, hoping eventually that everyone would become both world and national citizens.⁴²

The WIL’s refugee policy discussions occurred against the backdrop of their awareness of the Holocaust, yet revealed how their privileged position sometimes enabled them to speak for others rather than amplify marginalised voices directly. The WILPF had been aware of the growing antisemitism within and beyond Germany since 1915.⁴³ In 1935, the WIL’s monthly newssheet declared that ‘the worst tragedy in the world today is to have been born into a Jewish family in Germany’.⁴⁴ The WIL agreed that Germany was ‘disregarding elementary human rights’ and regularly reported on this injustice throughout the mid-1930s.⁴⁵ As Michael Fleming has explained, from 9 July 1942, the BBC began to report to the British public that in Poland, the Gestapo were killing people en masse with bullets, grenades, and mobile gas chambers.⁴⁶ Although news of Germany’s order for mass extermination of the Jews was not officially announced to the broader British Government until the end of that year, the WILPF appeared aware, at least in part, of the specific targeting of Jews.⁴⁷ Their response demonstrated how their approach to ‘pooled intelligence’ could become a form of appropriation rather than amplification.

The League commented in their international circular letter on the recent news of the killings in Poland, expressing indignation. They admitted this was ‘emotional and unconstructive’ but felt such anger was necessary as the ‘barometer of man’s conscience’ and ‘his moral strength’.⁴⁸ They concluded that ‘he who loses his sense of just indignation loses his inner capacity of sifting right from wrong and becomes a victim to moral and mental petrifaction’. The central argument of the letter appeared to urge members to remain indignant and avoid becoming desensitised by the mounting tales of suffering.⁴⁹ However, to do this, Jewish suffering was mobilised to reinforce ‘the spirit of Zurich’ – their 1919 congress known as a momentous event of national collaboration and moral strength. This approach revealed the problematic aspects of privileged pacifism – the ability to transform others’ suffering into moral lessons for the WILPF’s own cause.

The document continued:

The majority has always spoken for the minority, the strong for the weak. At our Zurich Congress in May 1919 representatives of the victor nations denounced the Treaties as carrying the germ of new wars. Representatives of the defeated peoples kept silent. Our work against anti-semitism was carried on by Christian not Jewish co-workers. Any number of instances to illustrate this practice of ours could be added. And this practice must stand. Our voice will reach those who cannot raise their own. We who are free to work for freedom will continue to be the keepers of those who are silenced in exile, enslaved in labour camps or killed by torture – wherever they are, whatever their race, their creed or their nationality.⁵⁰

This statement encapsulated both the possibilities and the dangers of privileged pacifism. Whilst recognising responsibility for fighting injustice, the WILPF simultaneously maintained the silence of those most affected.

This resulted in mixed outcomes at the 1946 Congress. The discussions translated into concrete policy positions that shaped the WILPF’s post-war advocacy. Delegates passed a resolution that stated ‘displaced persons in camps’ needed maximum freedom and opportunities for paid work in an effort to abolish forced labour. The delegates also called for the United Nations to initiate an ‘International Conference on Migration’ to organise provisions regarding ‘the stateless, passports, visas, exit and entrance permits’. Again, the Pool opened discussions about policies that could work to help refugees and showed a clear continuity between wartime planning and post-war implementation.

Finally, turning to the economic question, the WIL demonstrated their ability to connect domestic and international issues through an analytical framework. Questions five and six of the Pool of Opinion dealt with economic planning and imperialism. The WIL advocated for women’s employment and representation throughout government, emphasising social security and re-orienting economies away from profit and toward meeting human needs. They called for an end to imperialism and India’s immediate self-government. They proposed that there should be an ‘International Supervisory Body’ to help all states achieve self-governance and establish fair economic distribution, though they did not specify the structure of this supervisory body.

The outcomes of the 1946 Congress validated the Pool’s approach to economic and imperial questions. At the Congress, delegates reaffirmed the WILPF’s commitment to colonial independence. The sections of Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia presented a ‘minimum programme’ which argued that financial domination by cartels and other private organisations needed to be fought to build a peaceful economy. It was accepted by Congress, and resolutions were agreed that urged the UN to establish international cooperation through community control of raw materials.⁵¹ This aligned with the WIL’s response about a ‘Supervisory Body’ that prioritised human needs and fair distribution, demonstrating how the Pool provided foundations for post-war discussion and enabled more efficient policy development.⁵² Yet the absence of voices from colonised regions in the discussions about decolonisation revealed a fundamental contradiction at the heart of their international solidarity work.

The Pool of Opinion’s success lay not just in policy outcomes but in its method of maintaining international solidarity during wartime isolation. Indeed, it provided the foundation for post-war discussion, freeing time to devise practical plans and consider the perspectives of those who had been cut off by the conflict. Understanding the widespread desires of WILPF members before the Congress helped them identify areas of unity. This enabled them to present a unified image to the UN and other external groups through their resolutions (despite the fact that within WILPF there had always been starkly different views and fractures).⁵³ Nevertheless, this ‘pooled intelligence’ remained fundamentally constrained by the social position of its participants. It gathered intelligence from sections that shared similar class, racial, and national advantages, shaping not only what questions were asked but how solutions were conceived.

Conclusion

Overall, this article has challenged the historiographical characterisation of the WILPF as inactive during the Second World War and instead revealed a sophisticated organisation that maintained international solidarity. Although initially troubled by the war’s outbreak, the WIL remained committed to pacifism not because they opposed freedom, but because they sought to preserve a space for discussing peace and freedom during wartime. This choice led to the WIL’s growth in membership and laid the foundation for two phases of war work. The first phase was a small-scale attempt at pooled intelligence, focused on understanding the war’s impact. The second phase expanded this through the Pool of Opinion, connecting more national sections to establish concrete post-war reconstruction policies, including proposals for world government, and provisions for ‘displaced people’. The impact of the questionnaire upon the 1946 Congress was profound. It enabled delegates to produce agreed-upon resolutions that they could present to the United Nations to shape a free and more peaceful future.

This analysis has also revealed the significant limitations of privileged pacifism. While this privilege was a strategic asset that allowed the WILPF to preserve space for peace work when others could not, it also constrained their ability to truly represent those most affected by the conflict. Specifically, the Pool of Opinion succeeded in maintaining international solidarity among like-minded sections. Yet it also revealed how ‘pooled intelligence’ could become a form of selective knowledge gathering that reinforced existing power structures rather than challenging them. Whilst recognising the role of ‘majorities’ or ‘victors’ in causing injustice and acknowledging their responsibility in healing such damage was groundbreaking, the maintenance of silent or silenced victims hollowed the WILPF’s act.⁵⁴ The exclusion of non-Western and non-white voices was problematic. Additionally, the appropriation of others’ suffering for organisational purposes demonstrated that even progressive international organisations could at times reproduce the inequalities they sought to challenge. Analysis of the WILPF therefore raises the question: how can organisations maintain the space for peace work during conflict, while not reproducing the structural inequalities they seek to fight?

Nevertheless, the WIL’s wartime work remains historically significant for demonstrating how international solidarity could be maintained during periods of war through ‘pooled intelligence’. The benefit was a better prepared peace movement for post-war opportunities to create peace – evidence perhaps that in times of conflict, ‘never has there been a greater need for pooled intelligence’.